The Pentagon has a plan, and it’s jokingly referred to as FUCOP, an acronym for Former Yugoslavia Contingency Operations Planning. It represents months of brainstorming led by Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Maj. Gen. John Shalikashvili, NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Their task was to come up with scenarios for intervention (chart). NEWSWEEK has learned that the most serious proposals include:
Enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia with U.S. and allied air power.
Expanding the relief operation with protection from the air.
Arming Bosnians, mostly by airdrops.
Using ground troops to deter attacks on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province.
Forming safe havens within Bosnia.
The White House hasn’t said whether it will embrace anything beyond enforcing the no-fly zone-and whatever Bush settles on will become Clinton’s enduring problem (and that of his likely new secretaries for defense and state, Rep. Les Aspin and transition director Warren Christopher) in a matter of weeks. At the Pentagon, the no-fly zone is the clear-cut favorite. Over the last few weeks, the idea of enforcement has changed radically, from an empty warning to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to a full-fledged air campaign against Belgrade’s military machine. Washington is pushing for a new U.N. resolution that permits allied attacks on unauthorized planes and helicopters, and on Serbian ground targets “associated with” its air operations as well. That could include everything from power stations and fuel depots to military and civil communications networks. The air campaign would be triggered by Serbian defiance of the no-fly ban, or by an invasion of nearby Kosovo-or even just by international outrage over continuing human-rights abuses.
The proposal aims to halt the destruction in Bosnia by applying massive force against Serbia. “We learned military lessons in Vietnam and political lessons in the gulf,” explains a senior Pentagon source. The Vietnam lesson: “Incrementalism doesn’t work.” This time, “if the decision is made to take action, which is not certain at all,” says this Pentagon official, the United States and its allies have no intention of engaging Serbian troops on the ground.
The political lessons of the gulf war amount to new semantic rules of diplomacy. To muster an international coalition requires a broad Security Council resolution-to halt aggression, perhaps-and wide latitude in following up, preferably through “all necessary means.” That deliberately vague phrase is what allowed the gulf coalition to spend the first six weeks of the war bombing Iraq’s entire infrastructure, even though the U.N. resolutions permitting use of force in Operation Desert Storm dealt strictly with the liberation of Kuwait. State Department officials were looking for a similar mandate-carefully unspecific and adaptable to most contingencies-when they urged European leaders last week to sign on to a new U.N. resolution enforcing the flight ban.
They had trouble finding support at first. Cyrus Vance, former U.S. secretary of state and current U.N. special envoy, requested a special meeting with Bush to plead against any intervention. Bush officials said the president would not be swayed-but, NEWSWEEK has learned, they were handling Vance carefully for fear that he might quit in protest. In Brussels, NATO belatedly agreed to use its power to enforce the no-fly zone, but only after a series of compromises. France, which is not part of NATO’s military command, finally decided to support a plan that would allow it to contribute forces under an “ad hoc” group composed of alliance members.
Britain was a thornier problem, worrying about exposing its 2,700 troops assisting humanitarian aid in Bosnia to retaliation-particularly after Serbian nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic threatened to treat all U.N. ground units as “enemies” if the ban were enforced. To quell those fears, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd insisted on a communique reminding the Security Council of the need to continue relief efforts in Bosnia. Meanwhile, British U.N. representatives persuaded U.S. officials to delay a vote on the resolution until Prime Minister John Major could make his case to Bush over the weekend. Such finagling may be moot. Security Council Resolution 770, passed in August, empowers members to take “all measures necessary” to deliver relief “to Sarajevo and wherever needed”-a handy pretext for intervention.
The most important questions may not be decided on the floor of the General Assembly, but in the basement of the Pentagon. Should allies attack Serbian forces in Bosnia, or only targets in Serbia itself? How massive an air campaign is needed? General Powell isn’t looking for an Iraq-size operation but a bombing campaign damaging enough to force Milosevic’s unequivocal compliance. Can air power alone do the job? Air Force Gen. John Loh, head of Air Combat Command, recently said it would be “very difficult to force a fundamental change in the action in Bosnia solely through the use of air power.” Instead, he says, “I think there’s a role for a joint operation”-meaning troops on the ground as well. That’s probably Bill Clinton’s call. Last week he urged Serbian citizens to resolve the Balkan catastrophe by voting Milosevic out of office. If they fail to solve the problem for him, it will only increase the pressure for him to use stronger weapons than mere words.
The United States is pushing for a U.N. measure to enforce the no-fly-zone resolution passed in October. The United States also wants wording to allow airstrikes against Serbian ground targets. A wide-ranging bombing campaign would destroy Serbia’s power, fuel and communications infrastructures.
The current 23,000-strong relief operation is bogged down. The United States could revive and expand it by shipping supplies into a Croatian port and by giving combat escorts to the relief flights into Sarajevo.
The United States could press the Security Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. But weapons would have to be airdropped in and probably wouldn’t halt the Serbian offensive.
The United Nations could try to send troops to protect the Albanian majority in Kosovo. But this would breach Serbian sovereignty, and the troops would be little more than hostages.
The United States could establish one or more safe havens inside Bosnia-but only with ground forces.
